Designation of scientifi c theories from the ontosemantic perspective

Abstract

The main objective of this article is to contributein the solution of a prominent question on Philosophy ofScience regarding the way it is possible to illuminate themetatheoric problem about the ontology statute of scientifi ctheories. It is afi eld that must not be ignored, if the idea isto illuminate the statute that the theoretical terms contain,when referring to scientifi c theories. In order to reach it, theauthor turns to the distinctions defi ned in enunciativist andstructuralist conceptions of science, taking into account thedifferent ways in which these address what is meant as ascientifi c theory, and the way this determines the notionsthey have about theoretical terms. The analytical categoriesof Frege’s ontosemantics are considered, in order to makeit clear about the kind of reference scientifi c theories have(objects or functions).The designation of the theories aspredicate expressions whose referenceis a function of type“x is a P”, a distinction that does not relate observationalcategories and not on observational ones are proposed, butbetween concrete and abstract theories, and that leads toconclude that theories may be described as functions as wellas objects.